New Zealand public hospitals and related services were grouped into 23 Crown Health Enterprises and registered as companies in 1993. Integral 
Introduction
The New Zealand public health delivery system came under the governance of corporate boards of directors on 1␣ July␣ 1993 after more than a century of central and local political control. The move to corporate governance was made rapidly and was associated with
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Health reforms and the move to corporate governance
The most recent health reforms in New Zealand were announced by the government in 1991 and implemented in 1993. They were intended to improve access to effective and affordable care, encourage efficiency, flexibility and innovation, reduce waiting time and widen choice (Upton 1991). The Area Health Board system was abandoned in favour of a structure that separated the purchasing of health services from their provision. It was intended that each New Zealander's entitlement to health services would be mandated by the Core Health Committee, a national committee tasked with either developing a positive list of services to which people would be entitled or a negative list to which they would not. Four regional health authorities would purchase services from public, private and voluntary agencies, and 23 Crown Health Enterprises would manage the nation's public hospital and related services.
Competition and a business-like approach were central to these reforms. The public sector providers were to generate profits for government to re-invest in health services. In 1992, the National Interim Provider Board, an agency of the Prime Minister's Department established the Crown Health Enterprises according to the following principles:
• each would have clear commercial objectives with the Commerce Act 1986 as the cornerstone
• high-quality directors would be replaced if they were not able to perform satisfactorily
• shareholding Ministers would establish performance objectives
• an arm's length relationship would exist between the government and operational management
• a competitively neutral environment would exist with no in-built advantage to government-owned providers
• managers would have autonomy to make effective use of resources and mechanisms would be established to hold them strictly accountable for their performance in meeting the Ministers' objectives
• tax neutrality would exist with no disadvantage to the private sector
• the Treaty of Waitangi, which recognises the rights of the indigenous people of New␣ Zealand, would continue to apply (National Interim Provider Board 1992).
Public hospitals, mental hospitals and their related community services were provided by hospital boards until 1989. These boards were controlled within a bureaucratic model of governance by elected people from a variety of backgrounds. Arrangements began to change in 1989 when Area Health Boards were established to replace the hospital boards. The Minister of Health began to appoint members with commercial expertise to add to the governance expertise on boards, however they continued to operate within a bureaucratic model. Health board members had limited autonomy and those in governance did not have the powers of directors operating under the provisions of the Companies Act 1993, the statute mandating the operation of private companies in New Zealand. In July 1993 the latest round of health reform placed all their services within the Crown Health Enterprises network.
Within the past ten years, the New Zealand public health system has changed from a cooperative/collaborative system (up to 1993), to one in which government attempted to create a market (1993-96) with a return to cooperation/collaboration . Notwithstanding these radical changes, the system of governance of the pubic provider organisations has remained stable in a corporate model with a strong emphasis on rational decision-making within a commercial framework. 
Research design and methods
Research design
All directors of Crown Health Enterprises were invited to complete a questionnaire and this was followed by interviews with a sample of chairpersons. Other stakeholders in the sector were also studied. This article draws on the findings from the directors' survey and chair interviews.
Participants
The 95 directors who were the participants in this study were members of the boards of directors of the 23 New Zealand Crown Health Enterprises in 1997. Subjects were recruited by a mailed questionnaire, with a follow-up questionnaire sent to nonrespondents. The total response rate was 95/149 (64%). Twenty-seven per␣ cent of respondents had a health background (usually medicine or nursing), 41% a non-health professional background (often accounting, finance, law) with the remaining 32% from a variety of backgrounds including manufacturing, banking, retail and local government. Seventy-one per␣ cent were men.
The 12 chairs interviewed in 1998 were from a cross-section of large metropolitan, provincial city and small Crown Health Enterprises in both the North and South Islands. These interviews were used for elaboration of the issues raised by directors and are not fully reported in this article.
Questionnaire
Participants were asked to rate on a five-point Likert scale:
• their perception of the State's priority for performance in six areas in which it had expectations of directors: -business practice -business planning -financial performance -service/quality performance -change management, and -social responsibility
• the clarity of the State's expectations in each area, and
• whether the time spent in directors' meetings on these activities was appropriate.
The questionnaire explored the nature of the relationship between directors and the government as owner and the Crown Companies Monitoring and Advisory Unit as agent. The suitability and success of the business model was examined and the instrument to determine the nature of the Chair/Chief Executive Officer relationship compared with customary experience in a commercial organisation was sought.
Statistical methods
Analysis was carried out with the SPSS for Windows software package. The relationship between the variables was assessed using one-way analysis of variance and multiple regression analysis.
Results: Survey of directors
Directors considered that government placed the highest priority on performance in the business planning function. Priority was also given to 'sound business practice' and 'financial performance'. Table␣ 1 shows the perceptions of directors of government's expectations across the range of activities. Crown Health Enterprise performance in the social responsibility area is a lower priority than other areas.
Government was understood to be clearest in its expectations in the same areas as it was perceived to have the highest priority. This is shown in Table␣ 2. A lack of clarity was perceived in the change management and social responsibility areas. Service/quality performance 58.9
Change management 50.6
Social responsibility 33.7 * As measured by the percentage of directors who perceived government's priority for performance in the area as high or very high on a five-point Likert scale where 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = neither, 4 = high and 5 = very high Social responsibility 45.2 * As measured by the percentage of directors who perceived that they had been successful or very successful in meeting the expectations of government on a five-point Likert scale where 1 = very unsuccessful, 2 = unsuccessful, 3 = neither, 4 = successful and 5 = very successful Table␣ 3 shows that directors believed they had been more successful in meeting some shareholder expectations than others. They did not rate themselves highly in the area of financial performance.
Half the study participants (50.5%) found the level of reporting to the Crown Companies Monitoring and Advisory Unit was more or much more than they had expected. They viewed the role of the unit to be analogous to that of a control agency (80.4%), with only 28.6% perceiving it to be in the role of market analyst. Although 55.4% believed that there was a tendency for shareholders to by-pass directors and deal directly with management, only 17.9% considered that this was a problem. However 69.6% agreed or strongly agreed that the relationship between directors and government is compromised by the fact that the government is both a shareholder in the Crown Health Enterprises (Hospital and Health Services) and the dominant funder of public health services. Fifty-two per␣ cent agreed or strongly agreed that the relationship between the Chair and the Chief Executive Officer is more of a partnership than is customary in a commercial organisation. Those directors with a health background agree more strongly with this proposition than directors with non-health backgrounds (who comprised 73% of the␣ participants).
Discussion
Directors were clearest about their role in financial and business affairs. Nevertheless, there was and remains a statutory requirement on directors to act with social responsibility. A Chairperson of a Crown Health Enterprise in a provincial city explained the obligation to be socially responsible this way: Several chairpersons of large city Hospital and Health Services referred to their lack of identity within the community in which they served. Further, they said all directors in their cities had a low profile. This is in contrast with the situation in smaller centres where the directors have a much higher standing and where they find it is realistic to relate to major community organisations such as Rotary and iwi (local Maori authorities which can speak and act on behalf of their members). A quid pro quo here is that in small towns and cities local directors are less likely to be effective in driving structural change. As one chairperson of a small hospital and health service observed, '…if the Minister wants this local hospital closed down, he'd have to come and do it himself because we sure as hell aren't going to do it'. Another said, in reference to the problem of inefficient and (arguably) ineffective small hospitals, '…boy, it's hard being the 'axe murderer' in the small towns'. So while the corporate governance model operates comfortably in the metropolitan areas, directors who live in the smaller cities and districts are mindful of the political realities of survival in small-town New Zealand.
The New Zealand experience with corporate governance is in contrast with the United Kingdom experience with National Health Service trust governance in that the New Zealand boards appear to have played a stronger role. Ferlie, Ashburner and Fitzgerald (1995) report that non-executive (or non-employee) directors in the National Health Service trust setting, 'probed and sought further information but seldom shaped strategic decisions and only rarely confronted the executive'. The experience of chief executives in the New Zealand Crown Health Enterprise sector suggests the corporate governance model has had a more direct impact on business operations than this. One Chief Executive Officer (from 1993 until 1998) observed:
Boards brought a particular way of asking questions and discussing issues and they came from another paradigm which meant that management either had to shape up or in most cases they shipped out.
The Companies Act 1993 places a legal requirement upon company directors to act in company interests rather than in the interests of a broader group of stakeholders. One consequence of the purchaser-provider element of the health reforms is that there is no ambiguity about who is responsible for allocating resources to meet health needs. In the reformed health system in New Zealand it is the purchaser, not the provider, who is responsible for resource allocation to meet health need. One consequence of the commercial model concerns values. In any health system the potential exists for a clash of values among directors and staff involved in the provision of health services. Ferlie, Ashburner and Fitzgerald (1995) Under the old Area Health Board system, it would have been difficult to manage the politics of getting private beds in public hospitals and virtually impossible to close␣ anything.
While half the participants agreed or strongly agreed that the relationship between the Chair and the Chief Executive Officer is more of a partnership than is customary in a commercial organisation, a disproportionate number of these study participants came from a health background. Those directors most likely to know about the relationship in the non-health or commercial setting were less convinced. Among those directors who considered that the relationship involves more of a partnership, there was a clearly expressed view that health is somehow 'different'. Health was identified as 'new territory', with more complex demands from the government as shareholder. There was a consensus among Chairs that the political sensitivities required a different approach. Chairs who were interviewed had a range of views. Most identified politics as a factor. The Chair of a metropolitan Crown Health Enterprise explained the difference this␣ way:
…the only difference would be that the politics of it requires a different relationship…and understanding the vagaries of Wellington was not one of [the Chief Executive Officer's] strengths and I had worked in that for years…'
Williamson (1989), Stewart (1991) and Ferlie, Ashburner and Fitzgerald (1995) consistently report on the special relationship in health organisations between the Chief Executive Officer and the Chair. The suggestion from these writers is that the Chair probably plays a more significant role than s/he would in a comparable company in the private sector and that there is a depth to the relationship which often develops into something akin to a partnership. The results from our study are consistent with international findings.
Performance of the corporate model
While the purpose of this chapter is not an evaluation of the health reforms or their provider component, we include some discussion of how the corporate enterprises have performed because expectations of corporate governance were high. In fact, in some quarters, it was believed that corporate governance would deliver substantial savings in operating revenue.
Evaluating the model is difficult for a number of reasons. The introduction of corporate governance was one of several major changes that took place in 1993.
When it was introduced it was the government's intention that public providers of health services operate in a competitive environment. Indeed it was the State's belief that efficiencies in the sector would be generated as a result of this competition. The model was seen as both natural and necessary given the other elements of the reform program. Although the Coalition government in late 1996 mandated a shift to a cooperative culture, the corporate governance model has been retained. The language of management discourse has altered during the past six years from a harsh commercial discourse (competition, profits, agent-principal relations) to a discourse which acknowledges cooperation and working together for health gain as legitimate aims. For example, patients are no longer referred to as revenue-generating units by staff in the Health Funding Authority. However, despite this shift in language and expectations, the government still monitors Hospital and Health Service activity by using a number of financial and non-financial performance indicators. These are contained in a quarterly report that summarises Hospital and Health Service performance in league tables across 18 measures. The sector is costing more to operate that it was in 1993 but more work is being performed. The complexity of the workload has increased. 
Conclusion
Evaluating health policy is especially difficult when changes in policy are continually being made as lessons are learned. The corporate governance model has remained intact although the health reform program that commenced in 1991 has been amended significantly since that time. We believe that to evaluate corporate governance in the New Zealand public health sector would require a multiple stakeholder analysis that is beyond the scope of this article. However, we do comment on the operational/ commercial performance since it was in this area that government had high expectations of directors. Of the 11 measures of performance reported on by the Crown Companies [ Vol 23 • No 1 ] 2000 Monitoring and Advisory Unit over the past 15 months, six indicate performance improvement, four indicate a deterioration and one remains the same. This is a rather mixed report card for the Hospital and Health Services sector.
Directors of Crown Health Enterprises were clear in their understanding of what government wanted from its reform program and from them. They gave themselves good marks for performance in business systems development (see Table 3 ) but acknowledged their shortcomings with respect to being able to meet government's expectations in the areas of financial performance and social responsibility. In this respect, corporate governance has not delivered all it promised.
It was expected that corporate governance would deliver good commercial results at the beginning of the decade, with the experience gained it continues to be expected that corporate governance and good management will drive efficiencies and deliver effective services for the New Zealand public.
Ferlie, Ashburner and Fitzgerald (1995) note that there has been a tendency by government to ignore or conveniently forget previous experience and that maybe there is a case for slowing down rates of change to allow time for reflection and learning from the recent past. Perhaps now is the time to reflect on experience of corporate governance.
